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1  Introduction 
1.1  The topic 
Throughout the last century, advances in technology have placed tension on the scope and 
application of European intellectual property law, causing it to adjust to meet emerging demands 
for protection. One such need for adjustment was caused by the development and 
commercialization of computer programs, which led to new regulation constituting software as 
subject matter eligible for copyright protection.1 Currently, copyright is faced with an arguably 
even greater challenge: The rapid advances in artificial intelligence are calling into question some 
of the fundamental assumptions upon which intellectual property law rests.2   
Currently, the European framework of copyright law does not take non-human innovation into 
account. Meanwhile, advances in artificial intelligence are quickly making machine-generation of 
creative works a reality.3 Recent developments enable autonomous programs to create works of 
great value, ranging from software to literary works, music and images. The creative process 
involves limited or non-existent human contribution to the work. Thus, the process of artificial 
intelligence creation is fundamentally different from the creative processes traditional copyright 
regulation has previously been applied to. Consequently, copyright legislation is presented with a 
novel challenge; namely the regulation of works created by artificial intelligence programs. 
Institutions of the European Union have recently explicitly addressed the need to clarify legal 
implications of advancements in artificial intelligence. In May of 2016 the European Parliament’s 
Committee on Legal Affairs published a draft report with recommendations to the Commission 
on Civil Law Rules on Robotics, arguing that:  
“Robotics and AI [artificial intelligence] have become one of the most prominent 
technological trends of our century. The fast increase of their use and development brings 
new and difficult challenges to our society. […] It is crucial that regulation provides 
predictable and sufficiently clear conditions to incentivise European innovation in the 
area of robotics and AI.”4  
Copyright protection of works created by artificial intelligence programs constitutes one of these 
new and difficult challenges that require discussion. Therefore, the first research question of this 
thesis is whether works co-created or independently created by artificial intelligence systems are 
eligible for copyright protection under current EU copyright law.  
The discussion of this first research question will show that today’s copyright regulation was not 
written with artificial intelligence in mind. As a consequence, application of the traditional 
                                                
1 See the Software Directive 2009/24/EC. 
2 Butler, T. L. (1981), p. 747. 
3 Lewin, A. (2012), p. 4. 
4 European Parliament, Committee on Legal Affairs (2016), p. 20. 
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copyright regulation to works created by artificial intelligence arguably provides for unclear and 
likely unintended solutions in some cases. This warrants a discussion of the aptness of these 
current solutions, and furthermore of whether copyright legislation should be adjusted to better 
regulate works generated by artificial intelligence.  
These questions are currently being raised on European Parliament and Commission level. In a 
resolution of February 16, 2017, the Members of the European Parliament calls upon the 
Commission to address whether and how the current intellectual property legislation should be 
altered to accommodate the advancements in artificial intelligence.5 In light of this on-going 
legislative process, the second research question of this thesis is concerned with the copyright 
challenges that face the EU’s legislative branch in the wake of artificial intelligence advancements. 
Namely, the second research question of this thesis is to whom, if anyone, should the rights to 
works entirely generated by artificial intelligence systems be allocated? 
1.2  Structure  
The rest of this first chapter aims to give a reader unfamiliar with artificial intelligence an 
introduction to the field as a background for the analysis that follows in the subsequent chapters.  
Chapter two will present an overview of EU copyright regulation. First, the chapter includes a 
brief overview of the copyright framework of the EU, including a closer look at some of the 
directives that are addressed in the discussion of the research questions. Second, the underlying 
rationale for granting copyright protection will be addressed, as these arguments are essential in 
the analysis of both research questions. Additionally, a brief description of the main requirements 
for copyright protection under EU regulation will be given, as particularly one of these 
requirements is significant to the analysis in chapter three.  
Chapter three aims to give an answer to the first research question. Namely, whether AI-
generated works are eligible for copyright protection under current EU law. In this assessment, 
the interpretation of the originality requirement for copyright protection will be at the centre of 
discussion. The analysis will differentiate between four separate types of artificial intelligence-
generation of works, each of which involve various degrees of human contribution to the final 
output.  
The fourth chapter aims to answer the second research question: To whom, if anyone, should the 
rights to works created by artificial intelligence without any human contribution to the final work 
be allocated. As today’s copyright regulation was not written with the issue of artificial 
intelligence in mind, it is unclear whether the current allocation of rights is the one EU legislators 
deem suitable. The discussion will be strictly limited to arguments concerning what is most 
coherent with existing European copyright rationale, principles and regulation.  
                                                
5 European Parliament (2017), p. 9. Note that the resolution calls of the Commission to consider many areas of civil 
law. Intellectual property is one of the areas of law addressed.  
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Finally, the fifth chapter offers a conclusion to the two research questions of the thesis.  
This thesis will devote a significant amount of attention to the study and analysis of relevant EU 
directives and CJEU jurisprudence. In addition to relevant literature, the main objectives 
underlying EU copyright law will also be essential to the analysis of the issues this thesis aims to 
address.  
The issue will furthermore be assessed in light of the mentioned on-going discussions at 
European Parliament and Commission level. The European Parliament adopted a motion for 
resolution in February of 2017, calling upon the Commission to present one or more civil law 
proposals related to robotics and artificial intelligence.6 The resolution recognizes intellectual 
property as one of the areas of law that needs to be considered in this regard. The analysis of the 
research questions in this thesis includes reference to the Parliament’s relevant statements in the 
resolution. Additionally, the analysis will address the two documents on which the resolution was 
based; the draft report by the European Parliament’s Committee on Legal Affairs and the study 
published by the Parliament’s Policy Department C for Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional 
Affairs.7 The Commission has at the time of the submission of this thesis not yet addressed the 
Parliament’s resolution.  
1.3  Artificial intelligence and autonomous systems  
This section aims to give a reader unfamiliar with artificial intelligence an introduction to the 
field. The objective is to provide the reader with a background for the analysis of the legal aspects 
of this technology that follows in the subsequent chapters.  
Artificial intelligence (“AI”) is a field of science and a set of computational technologies inspired 
by the ways human beings use their nervous systems and bodies to sense, learn, reason, and take 
action.8 The ultimate goal of AI research is to simulate the human intelligence to the extent that 
programs can act and reason accurately and autonomously. A system is called autonomous when 
it has the ability to independently perform an assigned task without human guidance. The 
concept of artificial intelligence is a long-discussed topic, and to date, a universal agreement of 
the concept has not been reached. Yet Nils J. Nilsson has provided a definition accepted by the 
majority of the academic community: 
                                                
6 European Parliament (2017). 
7 See European Parliament, Committee on Legal Affairs (2016) and European Parliament, Policy Department C for 
Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs (2016). The first of which was also mentioned in the introduction to this 
thesis.  
8 Stone, P., et al. (2016), p. 4.  
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“Artificial intelligence is that activity devoted to making machines intelligent, and 
intelligence is that quality that enables an entity to function appropriately and with 
foresight in its environment.”9 
The field of AI was officially born in the 1950’s, when researchers first began to investigate ways 
in which machines could simulate aspects of human intelligence. The most influential ideas came 
from Alan Turing, who proposed a formal model of computing. Turing’s classic essay, 
Computing Machinery and Intelligence,10 imagines the possibility of computers created for 
simulating intelligence and explores many of the fundamentals of AI, including how intelligence 
might be tested, and how machines might be programmed to learn automatically.11 Heavy 
investment in the research and development of AI technologies followed in the next decades. 
However, by the 1980’s, despite promise in some aspects of AI, the field still had not achieved 
the significant practical successes that had been promised. This caused interest in AI to drop and 
funding to dry up. Nilsson calls this period the “AI winter”.12  
This last decade however, AI researchers have finally achieved the success that was predicted in 
the 50’s. Cheaper and more reliable hardware for sensing and actuation made robots easier to 
build, and the Internet provided the large datasets needed to train the programs. Moreover, the 
availability of computing power and storage enables statistical techniques to derive solutions and 
applications from the gathered data.13 
While early AI was merely able to create programmes tailored to the narrow function required - 
so-called “weak AI” - the newly emerged - so-called “strong AI” - fosters innovative thinking and 
logical reasoning abilities within the machine itself. In weak AI, the machine is programmed to 
act human, entailing that a programmer has direct control over the machine’s output. In contrast, 
strong AI aims to get a machine to “think” for itself. Randomness and a sense of autonomy are 
built into strong AI systems, causing the human connection to the output to be much more 
attenuated. These developments have caused AI to emerge as a profound influence on society’s 
development. The European Parliament expresses the expected impact of AI in the resolution of 
February 16th 2017 to the Commission:  
“[H]umankind stands on the threshold of an era when ever more sophisticated robots, 
bots, androids and other manifestations of artificial intelligence (“AI”) seem to be poised 
to unleash a new industrial revolution, which is likely to leave no stratum of society 
untouched.”14 
                                                
9 Nilsson, N. J. (2010), p. 13.   
10 Turing, A. (1950). 
11 Stone, P., et al. (2016), p. 50. 
12 Stone, P., et al. (2016), p. 51. 
13 Stone, P., et al. (2016), p. 51. 
14 European Parliament (2017), p. 1.  
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Once a mostly academic and non-practical field of science, twenty-first century AI enables a 
constellation of commercial technologies that have a substantial impact on everyday lives. Major 
research universities devote departments to AI studies, and technology companies such as Apple, 
Facebook, Alphabet, IBM, and Microsoft spend heavily to explore AI applications.15 
The progress can be demonstrated with a few examples of the latest achievements made by 
autonomous systems. IBM’s Watson program beat human contenders to win the Jeopardy 
challenge in 2011.16 Watson has recently also been successfully applied as an instrument for 
medical diagnosis. Furthermore, the AlphaGo program17 recently defeated the current human 
champions at the game of Go, which is known to be one of the most complex and intellectually 
demanding games there is.  
Even more interesting from this thesis’ point of view is the progress made by AI systems in the 
creative field. A recently published cookbook co-authored by IBM’s Watson is mechanically 
created by definition. Watson teamed up with the Institute of Culinary Education to produce a 
cookbook, titled “Cognitive Cooking with Chef Watson”.18 Another example of AI-generated 
literature can be found in Japan, where a short novel co-written by an AI program entered a 
literary contest and made it past the first stage of elimination.19 Although the novel did not go on 
to win the prize, it demonstrates how far AI technology has come in the creation of literary 
content.  
Further evidence of the creative abilities of AI programs is demonstrated by the recent 
dreamscapes produced by Google’s neural network “DeepDream”. Through the use of a 
technique Google calls “Inceptionism”, the AI is able to dream up an image when fed a picture 
of random noise.20 The resulting images turned out to be visually fascinating, and suggested AI 
could be used for artistic purposes. Furthermore, the painter e-David is a robot able to realize a 
canvas autonomously without reproducing something existing, choosing his own colors.21 
Recent projects have set out to explore completely autonomous creation of content through AI 
systems. In 2016, the Google Brain team launched the Magenta project, which directly addresses 
the question, “Can machines be creative?” The research project aims to advance the state-of-the 
art in music, video, image and text generation.22 The results of this and other similar projects are 
yet to be determined. Nevertheless, Google’s DeepDream, the Japanese novel, and Watson’s 
cookbook prove that AI programs are already capable of creating content in the creative 
category, which warrants the question of whether such works are, or should be, eligible for 
copyright protection under EU law.   
                                                
15 European Parliament (2017), p. 6. 
16 Ferrucci, D. A. (2012). 
17 Silver, D. (2016). See also Borowiec, S. and T. Lien (2016). 
18 Brandt, R. (2016).  
19 Schaub, M. (2016).  
20 Mordvintsev, A., C. Olah and M. Tyka (2015). 
21 Sayej, N. (2016).  
22 Google Brain Team (2017).  
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2  Overview of EU copyright regulation   
This section will first include a brief overview of the copyright framework of the EU, including a 
closer look at some of the directives that will be addressed in the discussion of the research 
questions. Second, the underlying rationale for granting copyright protection will be addressed, as 
these arguments are essential to the analysis of both research questions. Additionally, this chapter 
briefly describes the main requirements for copyright protection under current EU regulation, as 
a background to the further analysis of particularly the originality requirement in chapter three.  
2.1  Legal framework  
The analysis included in this thesis is primarily concerned with EU copyright regulation. 
Therefore, this section will give a brief introduction to the copyright framework of the EU, as 
well as a closer look at some of the directives that are important in the legal discussion that 
follows in chapters two through four.  
The EU’s regulatory framework for copyright and neighbouring rights (acquis) consists of a set 
of ten directives addressed to the member states, which harmonise essential rights of authors, 
performers, producers and broadcasters. Many of the EU directives reflect Member States’ 
obligations under the Berne Convention and the Rome Convention, as well as the obligations of 
the EU and its Member States under the World Trade Organisation “TRIPS” Agreement (1994) 
and the two World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO) Internet Treaties (1996).23 The 
overall goal in the EU harmonisation efforts is to enable copyright protected goods and services 
to move freely within the internal market.24  
One of the directives that will be subject to analysis is the Information Society Directive 
2001/29/EC (InfoSoc). The directive was motivated by the need to provide a common 
European basis for the implementation of the obligations set out in the WIPO Internet Treaties, 
WCT and WPPT (1996). It contains a rather comprehensive regulation of the rights granted to 
authors and owners of related rights as well as a conclusive, although nonbinding, catalogue of 
limitations.25  
A second directive that will be addressed is the Software Directive 2009/24/EC. It constitutes 
the protection of computer programs, entailing that the programmer of the underlying software 
of an AI program receives protection for the programme in itself. Other directives included in 
the discussion are the Database Directive 96/9/EC and the Term Directive 2006/116/EC.  
 
                                                
23 Namely, the WIPO Copyright Treaty and the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty. 
24 European Commission, “The EU copyright legislation” (2015). 
25 European Commission, “Copyright” (2016a). 
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2.2  Copyright law rationale  
Copyright as a legal instrument serves two main functions; it must provide sufficient protection 
to authors and right holders, while at the same time accommodating the information society and 
the public’s need for access to content.26 As stated in the preamble to the WIPO Copyright 
Treaty (1996), European copyright regulation seeks to accommodate “the need to maintain a 
balance between the rights of authors and the larger public interest, particularly education, 
research and access to information”. These considerations are also addressed in preamble 14 to 
the Infosoc Directive 2001/29/EC. 
It is generally accepted that intellectual property rights are considered to promote and encourage 
cultural and technological development.27 Essentially, the right to exclusively make use of their 
work provides the authors with a financial benefit to compensate him or her for the investment 
put into the creation of it.28 Without copyright protection, others could free ride on the efforts of 
creators and thereby restrain the development of creative works. Accordingly, the lack of well-
defined and properly enforced copyrights would discourage future investments in new literary, 
artistic and creative works.29 These considerations are accurately stated in preamble 10 to the 
Infosoc Directive 2001/29/EC:  
“The investment required to produce [creative] products … is considerable. Adequate 
legal protection of intellectual property rights is necessary in order to guarantee the 
availability of such a reward and provide the opportunity for satisfactory returns on this 
investment.” 
In addition to this financial aspect it is also considered just from a moral perspective to give the 
rights to a creation to the author who has intellectually created it. In this way, copyright 
protection aims to reward creativity as well as to stimulate and encourage investment in the 
creative sector.30 
Moreover, copyright is considered to have benefits from a larger societal and economic 
perspective. This concept is well explained in preamble 6 to the Infosoc Directive 2001/29/EC:  
“A harmonised legal framework on copyright and related rights, through increased legal 
certainty and while providing for a high level of protection of intellectual property, will 
foster substantial investment in creativity and innovation, including network 
infrastructure, and lead in turn to growth and increased competitiveness of European 
industry, both in the area of content provision and information technology and more 
                                                
26 Stamatoudi, I. and P. Torremans (2014), p. 1.   
27 As particularly emphazised in preamble 11 of the Infosoc Directive 2001/29/EC and in the preamble of the 
WIPO Copyright Treaty. 
28 Kur, A. and T. Dreier (2013), p. 241-242. 
29 OECD (2015), p. 217.  
30 European Commission (2016b).  
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generally across a wide range of industrial and cultural sectors. This will safeguard 
employment and encourage new job creation.” 
In sum, traditional copyright policy aims to maintain an economic incentive for development and 
expression of valuable ideas, promote scientific and literary development and prevent 
monopolization of the market. 31  Combined, these financial, moral and societal arguments 
constitute the background for today’s European copyright framework.  
2.3  Requirements for copyright protection  
The conditions for protection under EU copyright regulation vary depending on the work of art 
in question, as separate directives apply to the various types of subject matter. However, recent 
harmonization of EU copyright law has caused certain fundamental criteria to be applicable 
regardless of the work’s character. Due to the limited scope of this thesis, the following 
discussion will be based upon these common criteria.  
In order to qualify for copyright protection, a work of art has to fulfil some fundamental 
requirements. First, the work has to be classified as a protected subject matter. There is some 
discussion as to whether this criterion is still in line with EU law, as the CJEU cases Murphy and 
Painer32 may imply that whether a work qualifies for copyright protection requires solely that the 
work is original, and not that it also falls within a specific copyright-protected subject-matter.33 
However, the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (1986) seems 
to imply that it is a separate requirement that the work is a production in the literary, scientific or 
artistic domain. However, as AI programs are capable of creating and contributing to the creation 
of works in the literary, scientific or artistic domain, the (possible) subject matter condition does 
not prevent works by AI from copyright protection. Therefore, this criterion will not be 
discussed further in this thesis.  
Second, it is generally accepted that the Berne Convention entails that only “original” works 
qualify for protection.34 EU harmonization of the originality requirement through legislature has 
been limited, and no EU-Directive or guideline exists that uniformly defines the originality 
requirement for all types of subject matter. However, through CJEU practice the understanding 
of the originality requirement has to a great extent been harmonized, and an EU-wide notion of 
originality has been adopted.35 The directives concerning computer programs, databases and 
photographs36 state that a work is considered original if it is “the authors own intellectual 
                                                
31 Butler, T. L. (1981), p. 735. 
32 Joined Cases C-403/08 and C-429/08, Football Association Premier League v. QC Leisure and Karen Murphy v. 
Media Protection Services, [2011] ECR I-10909, ECJ Case 145/10, Painer v. Standard VerlagsGmBH and others, 
[2011] ECR I-0000. Hereafter referred to as Murphy and Painer.  
33 Rosati, E. (2013), p. 5. 
34 WIPO Intellectual Property Handbook: Policy, Law and Use (2004). Paragraph 5.171 et seq. 
35 Infopaq International v. Danske Dagblades Forening (Infopaq I), C-5/08 of 16 July 2009, [2009] ECR I-6569, 
Joined Cases C-403/08 and C-429/08, Murphy and Painer. These cases will be subject to analysis in section 2.4.  
36 Arts. 1 (3) of Directive 2009/22, 3 (1) of Directive 96/9 and Article 6 of Directive 2006/116. 
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creation”. The CJEU states in the Infopaq case that this interpretation of the originality criterion 
applies to all types of subject matter.37 Thus, the court constituted a uniform interpretation of 
originality. 38  The CJEU has further reiterated and elaborated on its understanding of the 
originality requirement in several subsequent cases,39 which along with the Infopaq case will be 
subject to in-depth analysis in section 3.2 below.40  
The CJEU holding in the Infopaq case implies that regardless of what kind of work an AI 
program creates, the work is only eligible for copyright protection if such works are original in 
the sense that it is the “author’s own intellectual creation”. The next chapter of the thesis is 
therefore concerned with interpreting this requirement more closely, aiming to determine 
whether and to what extent AI-generated works fulfil the originality requirement, thus qualifying 
them for copyright protection.  
 
  
                                                
37 Kur, A. and T. Dreier (2013), p. 291. 
38 Please note that the specifics of CJEU practice regarding the originality requirement is the subject of chapter 2.4.   
39 ECJ Cases C-393/09, Bezpečnostn. softwarov. asociace v. Ministerstvo kultury, [2010] ECR I-13971, paragraph 45 
and Murphy, paragraph 97. 
40 Rosati, E. (2013), p. xii.  
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3  Are works created by artificial intelligence systems eligible for 
copyright protection under current EU copyright legislation? 
3.1  Background 
The primary objective of this chapter of the thesis is to provide an answer to the first research 
question, namely: Are works created by AI systems eligible for copyright protection under current 
EU copyright legislation? 
The European Parliament has addressed the relevance and context of this issue several times. 
First, the resolution adopted by Parliament February 16, 2017, with recommendations to the 
Commission on Civil Law Rules on Robotics states:  
“[T]here are no [intellectual property] legal provisions that specifically apply to robotics, 
but … existing legal regimes and doctrines can be readily applied to robotics, although 
some aspects appear to call for specific consideration.”41 
In other words, the current copyright legislation is according to the Parliament partially applicable 
to AI-works. However, Parliament does not establish the outcome of such application. As the 
analysis of the research question in this chapter will demonstrate, the application of existing legal 
regimes and doctrines result in different outcomes depending on the type of AI-generation in 
question.  
The final sentence of the sited statement – “some aspects appear to call for specific 
consideration” - implies that the Commission is encouraged to consider whether some aspects of 
AI call for an adjustment in regulation. This de lege ferenda question is the subject of the second 
research question, which is analysed in chapter four below. This third chapter is solely dedicated 
to determining the outcome of the application of current legislation to various types of AI-works. 
Second, in the previously addressed draft report, on which the Parliament’s resolution is based, 
the Parliament’s Committee on Legal Affairs stresses that the criteria for “own intellectual 
creation” is determining for the outcome of the application of current copyright law, and 
moreover encourage the Commission to elaborate on the criteria’s interpretation with regards to 
AI. 42 However, the report does not attempt to give a suggestion as to the correct interpretation 
of the criteria.  
Third, a study requested by the European Parliament’s Committee on Legal Affairs43 and 
commissioned, supervised and published by the Policy Department C for Citizens’ Rights and 
                                                
41 European Parliament (2017), p. 9.  
42 European Parliament, Committee on Legal Affairs (2016), p. 21.  
43 European Parliament, Policy Department C for Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs (2016).  
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Constitutional Affairs also addresses the issue.44 The objective of the study was to evaluate and 
analyse, from a legal and ethical perspective, a number of future European civil law rules in 
robotics, including the one relating to intellectual property rights. The study, which was 
completed in October of 2016, stresses the question posed in the draft report:  
“Here the question that European policymakers might want to consider relates to the 
status of a robot’s own creations. ... Can an autonomous robot be deemed the author of 
an intellectual work, entitling it to copyright protection?”45 
As was the case with regards to the adopted resolution and the report, the study does not attempt 
to give an answer to the posed question; it merely stresses the importance of providing answers 
to it.  
Thus, although these three recently published documents all recognize the relevance and 
importance of the issue of copyright to AI-generated works, no conclusion can be drawn from 
them as to whether current regulation implies eligibility or not. The main objective of this section 
of the thesis is to provide possible answers to this question.  
This chapter will first provide a discussion of the originality requirement in general terms, as the 
requirement is significant to the discussion of whether copyright protection applies to AI-
generated works. Thereafter, an analysis of whether current regulation allows for copyright 
protection to AI-generated works will follow. Specifically, this second discussion will differentiate 
between four separate types of AI-generation of works, each of which involve various degrees of 
human contribution to the final output.  
3.2 The originality requirement 
3.2.1  EU copyright directives  
The originality requirement is only referred to by EU legislature in three directives: Articles 1 (3) 
of the Software Directive 91/250/EC, 3 (1) of the Database Directive 96/9/EC and Article 6 of 
the Term Directive 2006/116/EC. All three directives constitute that in order to deserve 
copyright protection, the work has to be original in the sense that it is the “author’s own 
intellectual creation”. The similarities in wording in the three directives imply that EU legislators 
meant for originality to have a common interpretation for these categories of works.  
However, it can be argued that despite the similar wording, the “author’s own intellectual 
creation” has a slightly stricter interpretation in the Term Directive 2006/116/EC, as it is stated 
in recital 17 in the preamble that an intellectual creation is an author’s own if it reflects the 
                                                
44 Please note however, that although the report was requested by Parliament, the opinions expressed in the 
document are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the European Parliament’s official position. 
45 European Parliament, Policy Department C for Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs (2016), p. 6.  
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“author’s personality”. This clarification cannot be found in the preambles to the Software 
Directive 91/250/EC or the Database Directive 96/9/EC. Moreover, the different rationales 
underlying the three directives supports the argument that the originality requirement for 
photographs does imply a stricter test than that of the Software Directive 91/250/EC and 
Database Directive 96/9/EC.46  
3.2.2  Precedent in the CJEU  
3.2.2.1  The value of precedent in the CJEU system  
Under EU law, there is no formal system of precedent. The lack of precedent was caused by the 
fear that a system of binding precedent did not align with the court’s purpose, which is to be of 
first and last resort and whose decisions could be overcome only by amending the treaties by the 
agreement and ratification by all the Member States.47  
Despite this formal rule of non-precedent, the CJEU has maintained consistency in its 
judgements and seldom differs from prior jurisprudence.48 The Da Costa decision49 is said to 
have initiated what is in effect a system of precedent under EU law.50 The decision clarified that 
the relationship between national courts and the CJEU is multilateral, meaning that CJEU rulings 
have impact on all national courts of the member states, regardless of which court has referred 
the case. The CILFIT decision51 further reinforced the precedent by clarifying that the CJEU 
rulings were to be authoritative in situations where the point of law was the same, even though 
the questions posed to the CJEU in earlier cases were different.52 There are also numerous 
instances where CJEU has employed the terminology of precedent and reviewed earlier decisions 
to confirm or distinguish from past cases.53 In conclusion, CJEU and national courts of the 
member states in effect relies on CJEU precedent to decide new cases. Therefore, the following 
section is concerned with analysis of CJEU cases on the topic of the originality.  
3.2.2.2  Analysis of decisions by the CJEU54 
The Infopaq case  
                                                
46 van Eechoud, M. M. (2009), p. 41.  
47 Arnull, A. (1999), p. 529. 
48 Rosati, E. (2013), p. 100. 
49 Joined Cases C-28/62 and C-30/62, Da Costa en Schaake NV, Jacob Maijer NV, Hoechst-Holland NV v 
Netherlands Inland Revenue Administration, [1963] 00061. 
50 Craig, P. P. and G. D. Búrca (2015), p. 472.  
51 ECJ Case C-283/81, Srl CILFIT and Lanificio di Gavardo SpA v Ministry of Health [1982]. 
52 Craig, P. P. and G. D. Búrca (2015), p. 499. 
53 Rosati, E. (2013), p. 101.  
54 Please note that this list of cases is not exhaustive, but reflects the scope of the thesis.   
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The case was concerned with whether Infopaq, a firm that by means of a data capture process 
drew up summaries of articles from Danish newspapers and sent them by e-mail to its customers, 
was obliged to obtain consent from the right holders of the articles before reproducing them in 
part.  
The relevant statement pertaining to this discussion from CJEU concerned the interpretation of 
the Infosoc Directive 2001/29/EC Article 2 (a), which states that authors have the exclusive 
right to authorize or prohibit reproduction of their “works”. CJEU held that the interpretation of 
“works” needed reversion to Article 2 of the Berne Convention, from which could be constituted 
that the protection of subject matters presupposes that it amounts to being an intellectual 
creation. Moreover, CJEU had to clarify the meaning of originality. By argument of 
harmonization and reference to Articles 1(3) of the Software Directive 91/250/EC, 3(1) of the 
Database Directive 96/9/EC, and 6 of the Term Directive 2006/116/EC, CJEU stated that 
Article 2 (a) of the Infosoc Directive 2001/29/EC entails that a work is protected by copyright 
only if it is original in the sense that it is it’s “author’s own intellectual creation”.55  Through this 
decision, CJEU achieved full harmonization of the originality requirement at the EU level. Thus, 
originality now has a uniform meaning across the directives concerning various subject matters. 
Namely, the originality requirement refers to the “author’s own intellectual creation”. 
Another interesting element of the Infopaq case is that CJEU gave a lot of importance to the 
intellectual act of selection and arrangement of text snippets:  
“Regarding the elements of such works covered by the protection, it should be observed 
that they consist of words which, considered in isolation, are not as such an intellectual 
creation of the author who employs them. It is only through the choice, sequence and 
combination of those words that the author may express his creativity in an original 
manner and achieve a result which is an intellectual creation.”56  
The creators of the newspaper articles had thus exercised a series of creative choices that made 
the texts original in the sense that they were the “author’s own intellectual creation”.   
The Painer case 
In Painer 57  one of the questions referred to CJEU was whether a photo-fit based on a 
photograph might be published in newspapers, magazines and on the Internet without the 
rightholder’s consent. Namely, the conferring court sought clarification as to whether the 
originality standard for photographs in Article 6 of the Term Directive 2006/116/EC includes 
portrait photographs. The court specified that relevant criteria in the assessment of whether a 
work is considered the “author’s own intellectual creation” are whether the author was able to 
                                                
55 Infopaq I, paragraph 37 
56 Infopaq I, paragraph 45. 
57 Painer, paragraphs 88 et seq. 
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“express his creative abilities in the production of the work by making free and creative choices”. 
Furthermore, by making those various choices, the author of a portrait photograph can stamp the 
work created with his “personal touch”. The court subsequently illustrated such creative choices:  
“In the preparation phase, the photographer can choose the background, the subject’s 
pose and the lighting. When taking a portrait photograph, he can choose the framing, the 
angle of view and the atmosphere created. Finally, when selecting the snapshot, the 
photographer may choose from a variety of developing techniques the one he wishes to 
adopt or, where appropriate, use computer software.”58 
The Murphy case 
The originality criterion was further clarified in the case of Murphy,59 in which CJEU considered 
whether copyright could be claimed in sporting events per se. In this regard, CJEU responded 
negatively and clarified that an “author’s own intellectual creation” involves that the process must 
leave room for “creative freedom for the purposes of copyright”. The court concluded that since 
football matches are subject to rules of the game, they leave no room for such creative freedom 
and cannot be subject to copyright. The statement implies that a work is considered original only 
if it is the result of its author’s creative freedom.  
The decisions in Infopaq, Painer and Murphy have clarified and developed the EU concept of 
originality. The notion of “author’s own intellectual creation”, which was adopted as the standard 
for the originality requirement in the Infopaq case entails, according to the mentioned cases, that 
the author made “free and creative choices” and expressed a “personal touch” while the process 
must leave room for “creative freedom”.60  
3.3  Are AI-generated works eligible for copyright protection under current EU law?   
3.3.1  Introductory remarks 
This section aims to provide an answer to the question of whether AI-generated material can be 
subject to copyright protection or not. The analysis will be closely tied to the previously 
addressed criteria for “own intellectual creation”. In addition, the rationale behind European 
copyright law addressed in section 2.2 above will be a significant source of argument in the 
analysis.  
The discussion distinguishes between four cases of AI-generation of works. Namely, AI co-
production, human selection of a work that has been entirely generated by AI, a work created by 
AI by use of brute force, and finally the case where a machine independently both creates and 
selects the work, without any human contribution beyond the initial programming of the AI 
                                                
58 Painer, paragraph 91. 
59 Murphy, paragraph 98. 
60 Rosati, E. (2013), p. 187.  
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software itself. As the following discussion will demonstrate, the first three cases of AI-
generation all have relatively clear and unambitious solutions to the question of copyright 
protection. The respective solutions seem to reflect whether the case compares to and resembles 
the types of creation processes traditional copyright law currently protects.  
The forth type of AI-creation is the most interesting one, as the answer to whether the output 
independently created and selected by an AI is eligible for protection is not clear and 
indisputable. Consequently, the thesis particularly aims to thoroughly analyse this case of AI-
generation.    
3.3.2  A work created by AI in collaboration with a human  
The first question is whether a work produced by AI in collaboration with a human qualifies for 
copyright protection. A human in the process of creating a work can use an AI program as a 
tool. Provided that the work fulfils the originality requirement, it is completely clear that the 
human can be given copyright to the work. Were this not so, Microsoft could claim copyright to 
works produced on Word, Adobe in Photoshop, etc. Even if the AI were to play an important 
part in the creative process of the work, the minimal contribution of the human being would 
make it possible to apply the copyright provisions. 61  This is the case for the previously 
mentioned cookbook, which the artificial intelligence machine Watson participated in designing. 
Although Watson had put together many of the unique flavor combinations, a man had worked 
out the recipes from Watson’s list of ingredients. In this case the man simply used the AI as a 
medium of his art, which does not prevent him from claiming copyright to the cookbook.  
This entails that even through AI represents a new type of technology, a human’s use of it in his 
or her creative process does not affect the copyrightability of the work. This concept is 
accurately described by Schafer, Komuves, Zatarain and Diver in the article “A fourth law of 
robotics? Copyright and the law and ethics of machine co-production”:  
“[T]he computer is [in this case] a mere tool used to translate the internal creative concept 
or idea into an external embodiment. This leaves the central conceptual vocabulary of 
copyright law unaffected: we still have the dichotomy between idea and expression, and 
the physical threshold between the two.”62 
Thus, AI-generation used as a tool in the creative process of a human does not yield uncertainty 
with regards to copyright protection.   
3.3.3  A work created by AI, yet selected by a human  
                                                
61 Nevejans, N. (2016), p. 278. 
62 Schafer, B., D. Komuves, J. M. N. Zatarain and L. Diver (2015), p. 223.  
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The second case regards the case where the AI independently creates the work, but the human 
contribution lies in the selection of which of the generated works are valuable and worthy of 
distribution. Namely, a human made decisions as to which creations or parts of creations made 
by the AI should be preserved. An example of such AI-generation followed by human selection 
can be found in the music industry, where AI-composed music is quickly becoming a reality.63 
Thus far, the algorithms are still inaccurate and unable to evaluate the attractiveness of each 
piece of music produced, which entails that it will often take many tries by the AI to achieve a 
successful composition. This requires humans to listen through the generated material to 
determine which of the pieces are valuable and worthy of distribution and which are not to be 
preserved. The question in this case is whether the mere selection by a human gives him the 
rights to claim copyright to the work.  
One example of a case that has strong parallels to this scenario is the famous “Monkey selfie”-
case. In 2011, a macaque monkey used a camera belonging to British photographer David Slater 
in Indonesia to take a series of pictures, including a few self-portraits. Slater maintained that he 
placed the camera on a tripod in order to get the monkeys to interact with it. One of the “selfie” 
pictures became famous worldwide after it was published in British media. The picture was 
uploaded to Wikipedia without Slater’s permission, which prompted him to send a removal 
request to Wikimedia Commons. Wikimedia refused to take down the picture and claimed that it 
was in the public domain because a monkey, which cannot own copyright to works, took the 
picture. While the monkey pressed the button, Slater made the selection of the pictures that were 
worthy of publication from the hundreds of pictures taken by the monkey. The question is if 
this enables Slater to claim copyright to the picture under the Term Directive 2006/116/EC. 
Please note however that the case has only been tried under U.S. copyright provisions. 
This “Monkey selfie”-case has paralells to the case of an AI program creating a work which is 
then selected by a human. In the analysis of the outcomes of these cases the Infopaq case may 
give direction. The above citation from the case indicates that a selection process can determine 
the presence of originality: “It is only through the choice, sequence and combination of those 
words that the author may express his creativity in an original manner and achieve a result which 
is an intellectual creation”. This citation demonstrates that the CJEU considers the act of 
selection and arrangement of text snippets to be an intellectual act relevant to the legal assesment. 
By the same line of argument, one can argue that there was an intellectual exercise in the 
selection of the hundreds of pictures by Slater, causing the requirement to an intellectual creation 
“reflecting his personality” in the Term Directive 2006/116/EC to be fulfilled.  
Similarly, it seems most in line with the interpretation of the originality reqirement in the 
Infopaq case that the human’s decisions as to which creations or parts of creations made by the 
AI should be preserved constitutes an intellectual act deeming the work original. This 
interpretation entails that the human who made decisions as to which creations or parts of 
creations made by the AI should be preserved can claim the rights to the work.  
                                                
63 I.e. the Flow Machines research project, funded by the European Research Council (ERC) and coordinated by 
François Pachet (Sony CSL Paris - UMPC): http://www.flow-machines.com/   
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Moreover, the case of AI-generation and human selection does not differ fundamentally from 
cases the courts have been faced with before. The Monkey-case illustrates that mere non-human 
creation followed by human selection is not unprecedented, suggesting that traditional copyright 
law and principles can be readily applied to the case of AI-generation followed by human 
selection.  
In conclusion, the interpretation in the Infopaq-case combined with the parallels to other cases 
of non-human creation implies that the rights to the work should be allocated to the human who 
selected it. However, note in this regard that neither this discussed question nor the parallel 
animal-case has been explicitly tried by the CJEU, which leaves some uncertainty as to the final 
outcome of such a case.  
3.3.4  A work created by AI by use of brute force 
Another interesting case can be illustrated by the claim of a Russian company, Qentis. It claimed 
to have made computer software that was able to create every possible text of ten to 400 words. 
By using statistical algorithms that combine individual letters, Qentis claimed to have generated 
and deployed 97.42 % of all texts of the given length. A “brute force” approach that generates all 
possible combinations of words in English will, eventually, produce every meaningful text there 
could be within the given range of words. The business model behind their idea was allegedly to 
become the world’s largest copyright holder. The company stated; “As Qentis approaches 100 % 
of content generation, all content owners will eventually have to pay royalties to our clients or 
face massive lawsuits”.64 Qentis turned out to be a satirical artwork created by the Vienna-based 
performance artist Michael Marcovici. Nevertheless, the question raised by the scenario is still 
interesting from a copyright perspective, as brute force technology exists. The question that arises 
in such a situation is a different one to the monkey-case, as all works are produced by brute force 
without a subsequent selection by a human. The question is whether Qentis in this case could 
have claimed copyright to all the machine-created texts.  
CJEU states as previously mentioned in the Infopaq case that the originality requirement is 
fulfilled through the author’s “choice, sequence and combination of … words”. In Painer CJEU 
states that originality depends on whether the author was able to “express his creative abilities in 
the production of the work by making free and creative choices”. In Murphy CJEU states that 
the creative process must leave room for “creative freedom”. These statements imply that the 
creative output has to be the result of at least some intentionality from the author. Since brute 
force technology does not rely on any choice, but rather aims to put together every combination 
of words without any consideration of which combinations of letters make up good texts, there is 
no intentionality involved in the process of creating the texts. Thus, the works produced by use 
of brute force does not fulfil the originality requirement in EU copyright law. 
                                                
64 Schafer, B., D. Komuves, J. M. N. Zatarain and L. Diver (2015), p. 225.  
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Additionally, the creative process of a brute force machine does not remotely resemble or 
compare to that of a human’s. Arguably, this type of creative process is almost the opposite of 
the one copyright traditionally aims to protect, as it involves absolutely no choice or judgement 
by the creator. This strongly supports that current copyright regulation does not protect the 
works made through use of this technique.    
In conclusion, it follows both from the above CJEU jurisprudence and from a larger perspective 
of copyright protection that works produced using only brute force are not eligible for copyright 
protection under current EU copyright law.  
3.3.5  A work entirely generated and selected by AI 
The recent developments in strong AI technology, as described in chapter one of this thesis, 
likely entail that we are moving into an era where machine production of creative works will 
become commercially viable, i.e. AI writes short news stories or produces music snippets to be 
used in games or commercials. Crucially for copyright, these will not only produce hundreds or 
even millions of different copies, but the program will select the works it sees fit. This thus 
removes the last important connection to human artistic creation from the equation—the human 
judgment that something is art or that a specific work is a successful embodiment of the artist’s 
vision.65 This entails that the role of the user of the AI program has been reduced to merely 
causing the output to be generated, by for example typing the word “compose” in a music 
generator program or “run program” into a text generator. In the absence of any human 
intervention relating to the creativeness of the output, the question is whether copyright can be 
claimed to such AI-creations. 
Note that this section is limited to the discussion of whether such works can be eligeble for 
copyright protection, and thus does not discuss to whom such rights may belong. To whom 
rights should be allocated is the subject of discussion in chapter four. 
The question is whether a work produced and selected by an AI program can be copyrighted 
under current EU regulation. One can argue that if the final work is indistinguishable from a 
human creation, it should have the same legal status as one created by a human, regardless of the 
method of production. This argument may find some legal support in the principle of non-
discrimination in copyright law. This principle traditionally refers to the right of an author or 
right holder to start a procedure when directly or indirectly treated in a less favourable way than 
other artists or rights holders in the same position.66 One may argue that this fundamental 
principle of copyright protection may also be given weight in other cases, i.e. whether it could 
also apply to the subject matter of copyright. This line of thought would entail that the principle 
supports that a work of art created by an AI system that is indistinguishable from one made by a 
human should receive protection if the work would have been protected if a human created it. 
                                                
65 Schafer, B., D. Komuves, J. M. N. Zatarain and L. Diver (2015), p. 225. 
66 Stamatoudi, I. and Torremans, P. (2014), p. 23.  
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Although this is an interesting analogy, it does not yet have any support in jurisprudence or other 
legal sources, and therefore cannot be given any weight in this analysis of current law. 
Looking to the aforementioned CJEU case law, the decisions in Infopaq, Painer and Murphy 
have clarified and developed the EU concept of originality. The notion of “author’s own 
intellectual creation”, which was adopted as the standard for the originality requirement in the 
Infopaq case, entails that the author made “free and creative choices” and expressed a “personal 
touch” while the process must leave room for “creative freedom” (Murphy).67  
What can be asserted from CJEU’s statements regarding the concept of originality and the notion 
of “author’s own intellectual creation” is that the determining factor is not the characteristics of the 
product as such and whether the final work is percieved as art, but rather the process leading up to the 
product. Namely, is this process a creative one, and did the author “express his creativity” in an 
original manner?  
The above CJEU jurisprudence arguably asserts that in order for a creation to be considered an 
original work under EU copyright law, one must be able to establish the existence of a 
consciousness in the production of it. Althrough the final product of AI-generation may lead one 
to believe so, the process of creation does not involve choices based on conciousness. This 
strongly suggests that AI-generated works are not eligible for copyright under current EU 
copyright law. Thus, CJEU jurisprudence seems to imply that assessment of whether copyright is 
awarded is based on the the process leading up to the product, and not on the final product itself.  
This conclusion is also in line with the EU copyright framework in general. A cornerstone of EU 
copyright law is the persona of the author. For instance, Article 7.1 of the Berne Convention as 
well as Article 1 of the Term Directive 2006/116/EC determines the term of protection based 
on the death of the author.6869 These provisions rest on a fundamental assumption that “authors” 
are something capable of dying - implying that an artificial entity cannot be considered the author 
of a work from a copyright perspective.70  
Moreover, as mentioned earlier in chapter two of this thesis, one element of the rationale behind 
copyright law is that it is considered just from a moral perspective to give the rights to a creation 
to the author who has intellectually created it. This rationale does not apply to an AI, which 
suggests that neither the AI, nor persons with attachments to it, can obtain copyright protection 
to the works it has created under current law.  
                                                
67 Rosati, E. (2013), p. 187.  
68 Article 7.1 of the Berne Convention: “The term of protection granted by this Convention shall be the life of the 
author and fifty years after his death.” 
69 Article 1 of the Term Directive: “The rights of an author of a literary or artistic work within the meaning of Article 
2 of the Berne Convention shall run for the life of the author and for 70 years after his death…” 
70 Clifford, R. D. (1996), p. 1683.  
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Arguably, the type of creative process associated with AI-generation is fundamentally different 
from the creative process that copyright traditionally aims to protect, because all human 
contribution and connection to the final work is excluded from the creative process. Moreover, 
the creative process of AI generation and selection does not have parallels to cases which current 
law traditionally applies to, as was argued for the case in section 3.3.3 above regarding generation 
by a non-human followed by selection by a human. The lack of parallels to existing creative 
processes supports that current copyright regulation does not apply to works generated and 
selected by AI. This thus suggests that no grounds for protection of such works can be 
established.  
Although there are several academic papers written on copyright to AI-generated works under 
the American Copyright Act, not much legal literature discussing the particular issue with regards 
to European law is yet published. However, the author of the above-mentioned study requested 
by the European Parliament’s Legal Affairs Committee, Natalie Nevejans, has recently published 
a book, in which she addresses the issue under French copyright law. Her conclusion is the same 
as the one asserted from the CJEU jurisprudence above, that only a natural person can be 
recognized as an author.71  
Based on CJEU jurisprudence, the system of EU copyright law and its rationale, along with 
supporting legal literature, copyright cannot be claimed in a work generated and selected by AI 
under current EU law. Thus, even if it is an exemplary achievement and the work is unanimously 
considered to be exceptionally artistic, in the absence of a human author who has participated in 
the creative process in whole or in part, the work will not be afforded copyright protection under 
current EU regulation.72  
3.3.6  Conclusion  
Whether or not copyright can be claimed in a work generated by an AI depends on the level of 
human contribution to the final product. Namely, in the evaluation of copyright under current 
regulation, a distinction is made between AI-users who are genuine authors from users who 
merely push a button and do not have creative influence on the output or the selection of it.73 In 
the case that a work is entirely generated by brute force or if it is both produced and selected by 
the AI, the current EU copyright law does not provide grounds for protection of the work. 
These results suggest that current copyright regulation does not apply to works produced 
through an entirely non-human creation process.  
This conclusion is supported by the fact that protection is only given to the cases of AI-
generation that have creative processes that have similarities to the creative processes traditionally 
protected by EU copyright law. Conversely, the AI-generation cases involving creative processes 
that are fundamentally different from the traditional human process of creation do not fall within 
                                                
71 Nevejans, N. (2016), p. 278. 
72 Nevejans, N. (2016), p. 278. 
73 Grimmelmann, J. (2015), p. 410. 
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the scope of protection under current copyright law. Thus, no grounds for protection can 
currently be established for works produced through an entirely non-human creation process.  
The conclusion also appears to be consistent with the statement included in the introduction to 
this chapter. Namely, the European Parliament resolution states that “[E]xisting legal regimes and 
doctrines can be readily applied to robotics, although some aspects appear to call for specific 
consideration.”74 The statement implies that current copyright regulation in most cases can be 
applied to works generated by means of AI, as was done without concern in the first three cases 
addressed above.75  
However, the European Parliament implies that some aspects call for “specific consideration” by 
the Commission. This thesis argues that one such case that requires consideration by legislators is 
the fourth case addressed above, namely works that are created and selected autonomously by an 
AI system. As concluded in section 3.3.5 above, such works are made through creative processes 
that are fundamentally different from the traditional human process of creation, and do not fall 
within the scope of protection under current copyright law. However, as today’s copyright 
regulation was not written with AI in mind, it is unclear whether the current solution of allocating 
the rights to AI-works to the public domain is the one EU legislators deem best suited. 
Therefore, the next chapter will address whether such works created by artificial intelligence 
without any human contribution to the final output should be awarded protection, and if so, to 
whom the rights should be granted.  
 
  
                                                
74 European Parliament (2017), p. 9.  
75 See sections 3.3.2, 3.3.3 and 3.3.4 above.  
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4 To whom, if anyone, should  the rights to works created by 
artificial intelligence systems without any human 
contribution to the final work be allocated? 
4.1  Introduction 
4.1.1  The issue 
Thus far this thesis has established that when AI programs generate output, difficult problems 
arise in deciding to whom ownership rights in the output should be allocated.76 As discussed in 
chapter three, applying the current authorship tests of EU copyright law provides different 
copyright solutions depending on the degree of human contribution to the final output. Section 
3.3.5 above concludes that output generated and selected without any human interference are 
currently in the public domain.  
This final chapter takes a de lege ferenda approach to this specific case of AI-generation: Namely, 
to whom, if anyone, should the rights to works created by artificial intelligence systems without 
any human contribution to the final work be allocated?  
In the resolution to the Commission of February 2017, Parliament declared that it “calls on the 
Commission to support a horizontal and technologically neutral approach to intellectual property 
applicable to the various sectors in which robotics could be employed”.77 Based on the European 
Parliament’s outspoken intention to achieve technology neutral European copyright legislation, 
the following discussion will aim to identify the solution that is most coherent with existing 
European copyright rationale, principles and regulation.  
4.1.2  Background 
The discussion of the first research question in chapter three demonstrated that today’s copyright 
regulation was not written with the issue of artificial intelligence in mind. Therefore, it is unclear 
whether the current solution of rights in the public domain is the one EU legislators deem best 
suited, or if it is arbitrary and unintentional. This warrants a discussion of the aptness of the 
current solution, and furthermore of whether adjustments to current legislation are needed.  
Moreover, machine creation is fundamentally different from anything copyright has ever faced, 
and therefore cannot without further discussion be evaluated in the same way as tools humans 
use in their creative process or as animals making creations at random. This fundamental 
difference is demonstrated by the fact that the EU is considering to create a specific legal status 
for robots, so that at least the most sophisticated autonomous robots could be established as 
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77 European Parliament (2017), p. 9.  
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having the status of electronic persons with specific rights and obligations.78  AI machines 
constitute a fundamentally new phenomenon and provide an entirely new method of creation. 
This strengthens the warranty for discussion of copyright protection to works of this novel 
nature.  
As accurately described in recital 6 to the Infosoc Directive 2001/29/EC it is in the EU’s best 
interest to address this currently uncertain issue of machine creation and to clarify the copyright 
regulation on this point:  
“Without harmonisation at Community level, legislative activities at national level which 
have already been initiated in a number of Member States in order to respond to the 
technological challenges might result in significant differences in protection and thereby 
in restrictions on the free movement of services and products incorporating, or based on, 
intellectual property, leading to a refragmentation of the internal market and legislative 
inconsistency.” 
These arguments were made with regard to the developments of technology that faced society 
around the beginning of the 21st century, but are arguably also valid for the developments and 
challenges we face today with regard to artificial intelligence. Insufficient or unclear protection of 
AI generated works may lead Member States to independently pass legislative acts, which in turn 
may be a barrier to the free movement of goods and services within the Community. This is one 
of the main reasons why unambiguous and deliberate regulation should be put forth at 
Community level.  
The urgency of discussing possible changes and adjustments to different aspects of existing civil 
law regulation is illustrated by the fact that several foreign jurisdictions, such as the US, Japan, 
China and South Korea, are considering, and to a certain extent have already taken, regulatory 
action with respect to AI in order to take account of emerging applications of such 
technologies.79  
The previously mentioned European Parliament motion for resolution with recommendations to 
the Commission on Civil Law Rules on Robotics also emphasize that predictable and sufficiently 
clear conditions are crucial to incentivise European innovation in the area of robotics and AI 
when concluding that:  
“The European industry could benefit from an efficient, coherent and transparent 
approach to regulation at Union level, providing predictable and sufficiently clear 
conditions under which enterprises could develop applications and plan their business 
models on a European scale while ensuring that the Union and its Member States 
maintain control over the regulatory standards to be set, so as not to be forced to adopt 
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and live with standards set by others, that is to say the third countries which are also at 
the forefront of the development of robotics and AI”.80  
Based on this, it can be established that adjustment in copyright legislation at the EU-level to 
accommodate changes brought by AI should, and likely will, be implemented. In this regulative 
process, legislators have several alternatives at their disposal.81 Specifically, the different solutions 
to allocation of rights to AI-generated works which will be subject to discussion in the following 
is: (a) Rights remain in the public domain; (b) Allocation of rights to the AI-machine; (c) 
Allocation of rights to the person behind the machine (the programmer); or (d) Allocation of 
rights to the user of the machine. The validity of and justification for these alternatives will be the 
subject of this final section of the thesis.  
4.2  Discussion of rights allocation alternatives 
(a)  Rights remain in the public domain 
The first alternative to be discussed is whether the rights to AI-generated works should remain in 
the public domain, entailing that no one owns the rights to them. This solution would be 
consistent with the traditionally implied assumption that authors of copyrightable works have to 
be human, and would entail denied copyright protection for AI-produced materials if the human 
input into the creation is not legally sufficient.82  
Importantly, granting copyright privileges where none are warranted creates unjustifiable barriers 
to access, which is not in line with the overall goal of securing the public’s access to content, 
particularly for purposes of education and research. Copyright monopoly also entails higher 
prices and reduced production, which is not in the consumer or public’s interest. Therefore, one 
must demand that copyright privileges are granted only when this is justified.  
However, as pointed out in chapter two, the law must balance the benefits that the public would 
derive from being able to freely use the end product against other considerations. Namely, 
traditional copyright policy aims to maintain an economic incentive for development and 
expression of valuable ideas, promote scientific and literary development and prevent 
monopolization of the market. Copyright availability for AI generated works would provide an 
incentive for their development and dissemination because the proprietary interests of investors 
and inventors would be guaranteed a degree of legal security not otherwise available.83   
Namely, if no protection is granted to the works of AI, the intellectual effort or investment put 
towards the development of creative AI-machines will likely be limited. In essence, if their output 
                                                
80 European Parliament (2017), p. 3-4.  
81 Butler, T. L. (1981), p. 734.  
82 Butler, T. L. (1981), p. 734. 
83 Butler, T. L. (1981), p. 735. 
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is not copyrightable and does not yield economic benefit, it will not be as worthwhile to develop 
them in the first place. Moreover, a competitive market for AI products would likely be 
encouraged by availability of copyright protection. These important policy considerations 
strongly suggest that the elimination of copyright protection for AI products is not the right 
solution. 
Additionally, granting copyright to the output may give the right holder motivation to bring the 
generated work into public circulation. If a flawless work has been created by use of an AI 
program, and the law deems the work incapable of being owned because of the lack of a human 
author, the user who proximately caused its creation has little incentive to go to the trouble of 
bringing forward a work that is in the public domain.84 Bringing a product to market often 
requires risk and financial investment, as marketing and product production can be costly. If 
there is no financial upside to bringing the product to market or to the public, then the product 
will likely never find its way to the world. This result is problematic from the perspective that 
society generally has an interest in works being made available to the public. Innovations that are 
kept secret do not promote the progress of science and the useful arts, as is the case for 
innovations that are revealed and disseminated. 85  Therefore, reward to those who bring 
innovations to the market can be justified based on the rationale behind copyright law.  
Albeit consistent with the traditional concept of an author as a person, denying protection is 
inconsistent with the historically flexible interpretation and application of copyright law followed 
by technological advancement. AI-products are the result of technological development, which 
supports that AI-generated works should be deemed within the historically flexible scope of 
copyright laws.86 
Finally, it will often be difficult, if not impossible, to discern whether a program or a human 
generated a particular work. Thus, enforceability problems would be particularly acute if rights 
are allocated in the public domain.87  
Based on these arguments against leaving the rights to AI-generated works in the public domain, 
the solution that seems most in line with copyright principles and rationale is allocation of the 
rights to someone. The question that follows is to whom.  
(b)  Allocation of rights to the AI-machine 
The law as it is currently configured cannot vest copyright to an AI-generated work to the AI 
itself, because the AI-machine has no legal personhood and thus cannot own rights.88 However, 
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the EU Commission is currently considering whether this should be the case, as a motion for 
resolution adopted by Parliament sets out the following:  
“Calls on the Commission, when carrying out an impact assessment of its future 
legislative instrument, to explore, analyse and consider the implications of all possible 
legal solutions, such as:  
… 
f) creating a specific legal status for robots in the long run, so that at least the most 
sophisticated autonomous robots could be established as having the status of electronic 
persons responsible for making good any damage they may cause, and possibly applying 
electronic personality to cases where robots make autonomous decisions or otherwise 
interact with third parties independently.”89  
The following discussion will therefore not dismiss the possibility of copyright to AI machines 
on the grounds that they are not currently legal entities, as this may soon be the case. The 
question is however, assuming that AI-machines in theory could be granted the rights to their 
own work, if this is a good solution of the rights allocation issue.  
First, the whole purpose of the intellectual property system is to grant rights to creators to induce 
them to innovate. Based on this rationale, it does not make sense to allocate intellectual property 
rights to machines, simply because they do not need to be given incentives to generate output.90 
Granting copyright privileges where none are warranted creates unjustifiable barriers to access, 
which strongly suggests that even if it was possible to grant rights to AI-machines directly, this is 
not a good solution.91 
Second, some practical hurdles also suggest that rights should not be allocated to the machine 
itself. Computers are by themselves unable to perform several tasks that a copyright holder must 
be able to perform to be eligible for protection, for example to sue an alleged infringer of its 
work or of transferring rights to others (e.g. renewal rights, licensing arrangements).92 As long as 
computers cannot think and act like humans, they are dependent on human instruction and 
assistance to fulfil the obligations of a right holder, which suggests that rights allocation to a 
machine does not constitute a good solution.  
Third, although legal interests have been recognized in trusts and corporations, these interests are 
based on the essentially human nature of the endeavour, for example evidenced by shareholder 
participation. Namely, the “legal person” status of a corporation reflects a need for society to 
recognize and facilitate a method for efficiently organizing human physical and intellectual effort 
to achieve maximum return on monetary and human capital investment. Public policy 
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considerations support the existence of trusts and corporations, but these arguments relating to 
legal persons do not apply to AI-machines.93  
In conclusion, the rationale behind copyright law combined with the impracticality of AI 
ownership of copyrights decisively suggests that the rights to AI-generated works should not be 
allocated to the AI itself.  
(c)  Allocation of rights to the person behind the machine (the programmer) 
Programmers are responsible for the creation of the AI software. The question is whether it is 
justified to attribute to the programmer rights to all the AI’s output.  
One argument in this regard is that without the programmer’s creativity in building the machine, 
the output might never have been brought into existence. If the output produced by a particular 
AI is of excellent quality, it may be fair to attribute at least part of the excellence in the output to 
the programmer. Moreover, creating an excellent generator program is intellectually demanding, 
time-consuming and expensive for the programmer.94 As noted in chapter two regarding the 
rationale behind copyright law, the effort that is put into creation of a copyrightable work is 
considered to be among the interests copyright law intends to protect. The effort and investment 
made by the programmer to develop the AI-machine suggests that the rights to the AI’s output 
should be awarded to the programmer.  
However, what gets programmed directly is just general information and principles, not unlike 
what teachers instil in their pupils.95 What the output of the machine might be however, is not 
predictable by the programmer. Granting rights to the programmer to all output created by the 
AI would in many ways mean rewarding him or her for works he did not creatively contribute to. 
Importantly, the programmer creates the potentiality for the creation of the output, but not its 
actuality.96 Awarding rights to a person who merely creates a potentiality for, but not the actuality 
of a work would be a significant break from traditional copyright principle, which strongly 
suggests that the programmer should not be given the rights to the output of the AI-machine he 
initially programmed.  
Additionally, enforceability will likely be a problem by allocating ownership rights exclusively to 
the programmer. The output will be in the hands of or under the control of someone other than 
the programmer, typically the user who has bought the rights to the program. In this case, the 
user has a strong interest in not reporting back to the programmer that a new piece of property 
has been created in which the programmer has rights. It will often be difficult to determine 
whether the machine the programmer created produced a particular output or not. This suggests 
that significant impracticalities are tied to awarding rights to the programmer.  
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While it may be tempting to collapse the distance between the programmer and the output of 
generative code, doing so would ignore both the mechanic origin of AI-works and the work’s 
great attenuation to human authorship and creativity.97 Thus, based on the lacking justification 
for allocating rights to the programmer and the impracticability that would follow from such an 
arrangement, the programmer should not be given the rights to the output created by the AI he 
or she initially programmed. Notably, the programmer will not be left without rights: The 
Software Directive 2009/24/EC constitutes the protection of computer programs, entailing that 
the programmer can claim rights to the AI-software in itself.  
(d)  Allocation of rights to the user of the machine 
The next alternative is to allocate the rights to the user of the machine. The question is if user-
authorship can be justified when the role of the user of the AI program has been reduced to 
merely causing the output to be generated, by for example typing the word “compose” in a music 
generator program or “text” into a text generator. Namely, the same program can be run 
repeatedly with identical inputs to generate different works.98 In this case the user’s instructions 
are so brief or general that the user’s contributions do not qualify for authorship under traditional 
authorship standards as concluded in section 3.3 above. Can it nonetheless be justified to allocate 
rights in the output to the user?  
To answer this, one must look for guidance and parallels in the underlying principles and existing 
regulation of copyright law. According to Article 2(3) of the Software Directive 91/250/EEC, 
the employer shall exclusively be entitled to exercise all economic rights in an employee’s 
computer program, where a program is created in the execution of the employee’s duties or 
where the employee merely follows instructions given by the employer. The regulation shows 
that legislators have found that the best solution in the case where a work is created by an 
employee acting as such, is to allocate the copyright to the person or entity who through the 
employment was responsible for causing a creative work to be brought into the world, regardless 
of whether they were directly involved in the creative effort.99  
Similarly, although the user of an AI-program has not contributed to the work creatively, the user 
is the person who most immediately caused the work to be brought into being. Based in this, it 
can be argued that one who uses a generator program in some sense has “employed” the 
computer and its programs for his creative endeavours. By this line of argument, similar 
considerations to those that underlie the employment-rule support allocation of rights in AI-
generated works to users, regardless of the extent of their creative input. 
However, no directives other than the Software Directive 91/250/EEC include this employment 
rule, and the question of employees’ copyrighted works in general is left for each member state to 
decide. In some countries, such as in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, national 
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copyright acts regulates employees’ copyright. In other countries, such as Germany, France and 
the Nordic countries, a transfer from the employee to the employer follows from general 
principles of law. This suggests that the above analogy has somewhat limited weight.  
As mentioned under (a), granting copyright to the user may give him or her motivation to bring 
the work into public circulation. Society generally has an interest in works being made available to 
the public. Innovations that are kept secret do not promote the progress of science and the 
useful arts as much as innovations that are revealed and disseminated.100 Users of AI programs 
are in much the same position as traditional authors in the sense that they are in the best position 
to take the initial steps to bring a work into the marketplace. Recognizing the user as the owner 
of AI-generated works would in this way seem to be consistent with the fundamental purposes 
underlying EU intellectual property law, because it has more potential to advance the pace of 
innovation than would be the case if no one was granted rights.101  
Furthermore, it is probable that denying copyright protection to AI-generated works would lead 
users to claim that they themselves authored work produced by an AI program. It would be very 
difficult for a court to decide whether the human contributed to the work to the extent that the 
creation deserves protection under current copyright law or if the work was entirely AI-
generated. Therefore, giving rights to the user is not only the most practicable solution, but also 
the one least likely to lead to litigation. These considerations also support allocating the rights to 
AI-generated works to the user.  
Another argument that supports allocation to the user is that he from an economic standpoint is 
the one who has invested in the AI and thus deserves the right to its output. Copyright rationale 
is partly founded on the idea that the right to exclusively make use of a created work provides the 
authors with a financial benefit to compensate him or her for the investment put into the 
creation of it. Similarly, the user of the software has invested in the rights to use the AI, either by 
purchase, lease, or license.102 This also provides the programmer with some reward for the value 
of the AI he has created.  
Although it is arguably unappealing to say that the act of merely tapping a button is an act of 
authorship justifying copyright for the user, parallels to the employment rule, considerations of 
innovation advancement, practicability and economic compensation to the user are all strong 
arguments that support allocation of the rights to the output of the AI to the person who used it 
when the work in question was generated.103  
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5  Conclusion  
In the intersection between complex technology and law, difficult regulatory questions often 
arise. In the wake of advancements in artificial intelligence, that is proceeding more quickly than 
any advancement before it, the EU legislation is faced with urgent challenges across many areas 
of civil law. One of the areas of regulation that the Commission has been requested by the 
European Parliament to consider adjustments to is intellectual property law. In light of this on-
going legislative process, the overall perspective of this thesis has been to address the copyright 
challenges that face the EU’s legislative branch following the artificial intelligence advancements.  
The first research question of this this thesis is whether AI-generated works are eligible for 
copyright protection under current law. The discussion of this question in chapter three concludes 
that the application of current copyright law to the four types of AI creation provides for suitable 
solutions that are aligned with the EU copyright regulation as a whole in three of the four cases. 
Thus, current law seems to be well suited to deal with most of the changes brought by the 
advancements in artificial intelligence we have seen so far. The only case of inconsistency to the 
copyright system arises in the application of current law to works created by AI without any 
human contribution to the final work. In this case, the thesis argues that current legislation is 
unsatisfying.  
Thus, EU’s legislative branch needs to consider if this warrants an adjustment to the current 
regulation. The thesis’ second research question is whether works created entirely by artificial 
intelligence systems without any human contribution to the final work should be protected by 
copyright, and if so, to whom the rights should be allocated. Chapter four analysed four different 
allocation alternatives, including allocation in the public domain. Based on the European 
Parliament’s outspoken intention to achieve a coherent and technology neutral European 
copyright legislation, this thesis ultimately concludes that there are strong arguments in favour of 
allocation to the person who used the machine when it created the output in question.  
The main arguments for this allocation alternative is that granting rights to the user may cause the 
product or information to reach the public, which is one of the important underlying ideas 
behind granting copyrights, and furthermore that allocation of rights to the user of a programme 
has some parallels to existing copyright legislation in the employment rule in Article 2(3) of the 
Software Directive 91/250/EEC. Finally, this solution is least likely to lead to litigation and also 
provides the user with financial compensation for investing in the AI, which aligns with the 
rationale behind copyright addressed in chapter two.   
In conclusion, artificial intelligence undeniably brings challenges and difficult discussions to 
copyright regulation. However, the conclusions of this thesis suggest that it is possible to 
overcome these challenges and maintain a coherent copyright regulation by making adjustments 
to the current framework.
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